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The Battle of Pea Ridge
BY EDWIN G. BEARSS
Winner of the Harry Truman Atoard for Meritorious
Service in the Field of Civil War History
Part V
General Albert Pike had been watching as Bosser's troops
came down off Pea Bidge and crossed the head of Gross
Timber Hollow. Pike, not knowing that Van Dorn had given
orders to fall back, believed Bosser's soldiers were en route
to reinforce the Missouri State Guard on the left. Shortly
thereafter, there was a wild outburst of cheering. Since
there were almost no stragglers drifting to the rear. Pike
and his companions concluded that "the day was ours."
While the officers were exchanging congratulations, another
officer galloped up and told Pike that the Federals held the
field. He was closely followed by a second, who informed
Pike that it was feared Van Dorn and Price had been
captured. The area where the two ranking officers had last
been seen "was full of Federals." Before Pike could reply, the
officer remarked, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's
cavalry are within 150 yards of you."'
At this time, one of Golonel Watie's Gherokees rode up.
Pike directed him to rejoin Watie, and to tell the colonel to
collect his regiment. Watie would report to Pike on the-
Telegraph road. The messenger, however, was unable to con-
tact Watie. After remaining on Pea Bidge for several hours
after the firing had ceased, Watie discovered the Federals; had
sent a "flying column" up Gross Timber Hollow. Fearful lest
he be cut off, Watie, accompanied by his regiment, struck
out cross country for Gamp Stephens.''
Meanwhile, the situation had continued to deteriorate. Two
batteries came rumbling down the Telegraph road from Elk-
1 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 290-291.
2 Ibid., 291.
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honi Tavern. Calling to the captain of one of the batteries,
Pike asked where they were going. The captain replied that
some one had ordered a retreatr As the guns thundered past
the thoroughly bewildered general, one of the artillerists was
heard to cry out, "Close up, or you will all be cut to pieces."
Wheeling their mounts around. Pike and his comrades ac-
companied the batteries. At the point where the Telegraph
road crosses Big Sugar Creek, Pike sought to rally the troops
which had retreated down Cross Timber Hollow. Here, the
Confederates would have plenty of open ground in which
to form for battle, while the bluecoats would find their move-
ments restricted by the narrow walls of the hollow. It was
with difficulty that Pike prevailed on the cannoneers to halt
and throw their guns into battery. Finally, three pieces were
put into position and sighted to command the mouth of the
hollow. Two regiments of infantry were ordered to support
the guns. Before the footsoldiers could be deployed, the
head of the pursuing column appeared.^
o » »
Ceneral Curtis reached Elkhorn Tavern soon after the
firing stopped and found that the Rebels had vanished. Ac-
companied by his escort, Bowen's battalion, Curtis started up
the Telegraph road. Almost as soon as he entered Cross Tim-
ber Hollow, the general sighted a number of stragglers and
wagons beating a hasty retreat up the hollow. An aide raced
to the rear to bring up a battery. Within a few minutes the
gunners of the 1st Missouri Flying Artillery thundered up
with their two remaining pieces. Throwing their guns into
battery, tbe Missourians "threw a few shots" at the rapidly
disappearing foe. Looking about, Curtis was disappointed to
see that except for his escort, the only mounted unit in the
area was a detachment from the 5th Missouri Cavalry. Orders
were issued for these two small commands to press the pur-
suit up the Telegraph road.
As soon as the troopers moved off, Curtis prepared to re-
turn to Elkhorn Tavern. Evidently, the general made a sweep
to the east. When he reached the hotel, he learned that Sigel
had proceeded up the Telegraph road with most of his wing.
3 Ibid.
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Curtis, was distressed by this hews. Almost all of the troops
which the. general had committed to press the pursuit had
gone up the Telegraph road toward Keetsville. The more he
thought about this situation, the more fretful Curtis became.
He felt confident that "a frightened foe was not likely" to
strike north. Several staff officers were sent spurring off with
orders for Sigel to retrace his steps. Scouts were sent to see if
they could locate Van Dorn's army.*
o « «
Immediately upon reaching Elkhorn Tavern, Sigel had
called for Captain Eugene von. Kielmansegge. The captain
and one company of the 5th Missouri Cavalry was sent rac-
ing up the Telegraph road. A "flying column" consisted of the
3d and 17th Missouri and two guns of the Flying Artillery
followed close on the heels of the horsemen. At the same time,
Sigel had Osterhaus form his division. Placing himself at the
head of Osterhaus' command, Sigel rode down into Cross
Timber Hollow.^
Except for a number of stragglers rounded up by the
cavalry, Bowen's battalion and the 5th Missouri, Sigel's
column encountered practically no resistance as it pushed
northward. Approaching Big Sugar Creek, the bluecoats
sighted Pike's batteries. Unlimbering one of their pieces, the
cannoneers of the Flying Artillery sent a round whistling
toward the Rebels. At this, the cry "The Cavalry are comingl"
was raised by the Confederates.
Whereupon the gunners hitched up their pieces. The re-
treat was resumed, amid great confusion. Pike's pleas to stay
and fight fell on deaf ears.
Supposing that the fleeing greyclads would turn into the
Bentonville Detour, Pike and his staff raced ahead. The
general felt the climb up the steep grade west of Big Sugar
Creek would slow down the retreating column enough for
him to get control of the situation. When he gained the
crest of the divide. Pike looked back. He was shocked and
dismayed to see "our retreating troops, batteries and all, had
4 Ibid., 202.
5 Ibid., 215, 220.
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passed by on the Telegraph road, the enemy's cavalry pur-
suing, en route for Springfield, Mo." ®
Pike and his few companions remained on the rim over-
looking the hollow for a few moments. They were uncertain
what their next move ought to be. Spotting the Confederate
horsemen, the Union gunners quickly threw one of their
pieces in battery. Opening fire, they helped Pike make up
his mind. The Rebel officers dug their spurs into their
horses' flanks and started for Bentonville at a high lope.''
Reaching the point where the Bentonville Detour branched
off from the Telegraph road, Sigel called a brief halt. His
scouts examined the ground, and told Sigel that Confederates
had taken both roads. To be on the safe side, Sigel called for
Colonel Knobelsdorff. The colonel was to take his regiment
—the 44th Illinois—two companies of the 36th Illinois, two
guns of the 1st Missouri Flying Artillery, and a company of
the 5th Missouri Cavalry and reconnoiter the Bentonville
Detour. Sigel with the rest of his command would press the
pursuit up the Telegraph road.^
Darkness overtook Sigel's column before it reached Keets-
ville. The troops bivouacked for the night in the hollow a
short distance south of the village. According to one of the
soldiers, the "cross and supperless, stretched [their] weary
limbs upon the ground and slept soundly.''^
The next morning (the 9th), the march was resumed;
Keetsville was entered at an early hour. Questioning the in-,
habitants, Sigel learned that the Confederate force which;
he had followed from the battlefield had divided. One group
was said to have headed for Berryville, the other for Pine-
ville.
Sigel was placed in a quandry. He didn't know in which
direction to turn. A staff officer soon rode into Keetsville
with a message from Curtis for Sigel to return to.' Little
Sugar Creek. This dispatch solved Sigel's dilemma. Before
6 Ihid., 291. It has been impossible to determine which of the
Confederates batteries retreated up Cross Timber Hollow and which
accompanied Van Dom.
7 Ihid.
8 Ihid.. 215, 225.
9 Ibid., 220; Bennett and Haigh, History of the 36th Illinois, 170.
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evacuating Keetsville,'Sigel's-troops were cheered by the ar-
rival of a heavily guarded supply train loaded with commis-
sary supplies.-from . Springfield, Before starting . on the
return march, the "half famished" bluecoats were issued hard-
tack and bacon. By 4 p.m. Sigel's column had rejoined the
army.'"
After being detached on tbe afternoon of the 8th, Colonel
Knobelsdorffs command had pushed ahead cautiously along
the Bentonville Detour, When he stopped for the night,
Knobelsdorff covered his camp with a strong line of outposts.
Learning that a Union column (Knobelsdorffs) bad turned
into the Bentonville Detour, Pike pushed on toward Benton-
ville. Late in the afternoon, the general encountered his
brigade quartermaster. From him, the general learned that
the trains had left Camp Stephens. Shortly thereafter, a wild
rumor reached Pike. According to this report, Sigel, striking
swiftly down the valley of Little Sugar Creek, had blocked
the road. The trains, he reasoned, were as good as lost.
Abandoning the Bentonville Detour in favor of a road
farther to the west. Pike sought to avoid the patrols which
he knew Curtis would send to mop up Confederate stragglers.
Just before dark on the 8th, Pike's party ran into Colonel
Frank A. Rector of the 17th Arkansas. The colonel told Pike
that his 500 men were in no condition to march more than
eight miles a day. Consequently, he planned to have bis
troops cache their arms and disperse. Rector asked Pike's
opinion of this plan. Since Pike mistakenly believed that Van
Dorn and Price had been captured and the train taken, he
told Rector that "he thought the course he proposed was the
wisest one under the circumstances." Rector proceeded to
carry out his plan. Unfortunately for the Confederates, a
Union patrol stumbled on the cave in which Rector's troops
had hidden their arms.
After a hard, circuitious ride. Pike and his comrades reached
Elm Springs on the 10th. Here, the general found that there
was no truth to the reported capture of the Confederate
10 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 215, 220, 279; Bennett and Haigh,
History of the 36th Illinoi.'i, 170. The train was guarded by a combat
patrol commanded by Major Joseph Conrad, 150 troopers of Colonel
Clark Wright's 6th Missouri Cavalry, and 300 replacements.
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trains. From the Gonfederate outposts who garrisoned the
hamlet. Pike learned that.his Indians were en route back to
the Indian Territory. Pressing on after his command. Pike
overtook the brigade at Gincinnati.'^
It was 9 a.m. on March 9 before Golonel Knobelsdorff
resumed the pursuit. Feeling its way ahead, Knobelsdorff's
column penetrated to within five miles of Bentonville. Here,
Knobelsdorff was joined by the 1st Missouri Gavalary. At this,
the overly cautious Knobelsdorff recalled his troops and
retraced his steps. Knobelsdorff's combat teams spent the
night camped on the Bentonville Detour, a mile east of Big
Sugar Greek. On the 10th, Knobelsdorff, having accomplished
absolutely nothing, rejoined Sigel's wing. 12
* * » . •
It was almost 2 p.m. on March 8, before General Gurtis was
able to obtain sufficient information from his patrols to
satisfy hiihself that most of Van Dorn's Army of the West had
taken the Huntsville road. Upon doing so, he called for
Ghief of Gavalry Golonel Bussey. Bussey was told to take the
battalion of the 3d Iowa Gavalry and pursue the Bebeis
toward Huntsville. Within a few minutes, Bussey had his
column in motion. •^
The 3d Texas Gavalry had been given the task of covering
Van Dorn's retreat. Since the Rebel leaders had expressed
fear that the Union cavalry would fall upon their rear before
it reached the hollows, Golonel Lane massed his regiment
across the Huntsville road, a mile and one-half east of the
tavern. Supported by the St. Louis Artillery, the Texans held
their ground until the last of the army had passed. After
waiting several hours to insure that the main column had a
good start. Lane recalled his men and followed.''*
As a result of the Federals' failure to pinpoint immediately
their line of retreat, the Gonfederates were able to get a
good head start. Despite their best efforts, Bussey and his
Iowans were unable to overtake Van Dorn's rear guard. It
11 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 225, 291-292.
12 Hid., 225. Two companies of the 44th Illinois were left to watch
the Bentonville Detour.
13 Ibid., 202, 234. . . . . . .
14 Ibid., 294, 300. . . . . ...
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was starting to get dark, when Bussey abandoned the chase
and retraced his steps. This foray by the Union horsemen vy^ as
not a complete bust because the hard-riding Iowans succeed-
ed in bagging 59 Rebel stragglers.'^
After fording tbe White River, Van Dorn halted his column.
Van Dorn, having placed a water barrier between his; army
and the Federals, decided to let his weary men rest. Orders
were issued for the troops to camp near Van Winkle's sawmill.
In the mea;ntime. Van Dorn had learned that a number of
his batteries had retreated by way of tbe Telegraph road. At
Keetsville, Van Dorn was told, the artillerists and their escort
would find a road leading to Huntsville. The general accord-
ingly called for Cates and Lane. The two colonels were
directed to proceed to Huntsville with tbeir two cavalry
regiments and meet the artillery. The guns were to be escort-
ed to Van Buren, where Van Dorn planned to reorganize his
army, preparatory to undertaking a new campaign.'^
At the same time. Van Dorn organized a burial detail.
Covered by a flag of truce, this group would return to the
field and request permission from Ceneral Curtis to inter the
Confederate dead.''
Van Dorn bad bis troops on the road early on the 9th.
Passing to the east of Fayetteville, Van Dorn headed for
Van Buren. Since tbe supply trains were with General Green,
the troops suffered from a shortage of rations. For several
days they were compelled to subsist "on parched corn and
such other scanty resources as the waste and barren mountain
region" which they passed through afforded. To make matters
worse, it started to rain on the morning of the 9th. The
exhausted Confederates' troubles were compounded by mud-
dy mountain roads and swollen streams. A large number of
men straggled; others deserted the colors.
It was a bitter, broken down army wbich reached Frog
Bayou, seven miles from Van Buren, on the evening of March
12. Here, the troops were permitted to camp and recoup
15 Ibid., 235. • . .
16 ifcid.,^  291,. 300-301; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Con-federate Brigade, 178. . '
17 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 178;
O. R., Series I, Vol. VIIT, 193-194.
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their strength for the new campaign of which Van Dom
dreamed. Staff officers were sent with orders for Green's,
Stone's and Gates' commands to rendezvous with the main
column on Frog Bayou.'^
9 « «
About daybreak on March 8, General Green had sent one
of his aides racing ahead to see General Price. The aide was
to tell "Old Pap" that Green's division was still at Camp
Stephens.: Long before the messenger returned. Colonel
Robert C. Wood of Price's staff reached Green's command
post. He told Green that Price wanted him to bring up the
trains. . • .
Green was a man of action. Within a few minutes, the
teamsters had hitched up their wagons and the train was in
motion. To provide for the train's security. Green divided his
command. Part marched in front, the remainder in the rear of
the wagons. Mounted patrols were thrown out to the east to
guard against a sudden flank attack. Pressing rapidly ahead
along the Bentonville Detour, Green's column passed around
the northwestern point of Pea Ridge.
The morning was well along by the time Green's vanguard
turned into the Telegraph road. Shortly thereafter. Green
encountered the messenger he had sent to get in touch with
General Price. The aide informed the general that he was to
turn the train around and return to Elm Springs. At Ehn
Springs, Green would "await further orders, unless hard
pressed by the enemy." If he were attacked by the foe. Green
was to retire into the Boston Mountains.
It was with a heavy heart that the agressive Green gave the
order for the teamsters to turn their wagons around and for
his division to counter-march. Green stopped briefly at Camp
Stephens to let Colonel Stone, who was in charge of Green's
trains, know that the Army of the West had been compelled
to abandon its position astride Gurtis' supply line.
Colonel Douglas H. Cooper had reached Camp Stephens
with several fresh units from the Indian Territory during
Green's brief absence. After hstening to what Green had to
18 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade,-nS;
O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 281,-777, 783-784. ' •'-,-.
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say. Cooper decided not to press on. Since Creen was worried
about a cavalry attack on the trains. Cooper agreed to help
escort the wagons to Elm Springs. Colonel Drew's regiment
would accompany Cooper's column. •
While Stone was turning out his command. Green pushed
on. Darkness had blanketed the area before Creen's tired
command reached Bentonville.'^
It took Colonel Stone several hours to get his wagons ready
to roll. Evacuating Camp Stephens, Stone's column followed
along behind Creen's, Nightfall on the 8th, found Stone's
command caniped ori the prairie, north of Bentonville. To
present a surprise attack on his camp. Stone left strong com-
bat patrol to watch the Bentonville road.^"
« o « .
About the same timé as Van Dorn's troops were breaking
camp on the morning of the 9th, Ceneral Curtis called for
Colonel Bussey. Curtis told Bussey to take the 3d Iowa,
Bowen's Battalion, and a battalion of the 1st Missouri Cavalry
and see if he could overtake the Rebel trains which were
known to be retreating via Bentonville. Bussey soon had his
men in the saddle and on the road. Passing rapidly down
Little Sugar Creek valley, the bluecoats occupied Camp
Stephens. Here, the Federals found numerous signs that a
large force of Confederates had recently evacuated the area.
Scattered about the abandoned encampment was a large
amount of public property (arms and accoutrements) and
personal gear, such as is usually found when troops are pulled
out of an area on short notice.
After a brief pause to inspect the camp, Bussey pushed on.
A short distance north of Bentonville, Bussey's vanguard, was
fired on by several Confederate scouts. Pursued by Bussey's
troopers, the greyclads fled through Bentonville. In this run-
ning fight, one Rebel was shot from his horse.
By 2 p.m. Bussey's cavalrymen had occupied the town.
Bussey now learned from his scouts that a small Confederate
19 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 292, 317.
20 Ihid.; 304, 318. In addition to the 6th Texas Cavalry, Stone's com-
mand included: the 1st Arkansas Cavalary Battalion, the 1st Te.xas
Cavalry Battalion, a detachment of the l l t h Texas Cavalry, the 22d
Arkansas Infantry Regiment, and Provence's Arkansas Battery.
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patrol was hovering in the brush south of Bentonville, At
this, Bussey shouted for Major Bowen to bring up his moun-
tain howitzers. Two shots from tbe "Jackass" battery sent tbe
Rebels scampering.
Bussey questioned the inhabitants. They told Bussey that a
large number of Confederates (Colonel Stone's command)
had passed through Bentonville, several hours prior to the
Yankees' arrival. The Rebel horsemen and wagons were said
to have taken the Elm Springs road,
A hasty inspection of his fagged out command convinced
Bussey that his men and mounts were in no condition to
press the pursuit. He determined to return to Little Sugar
Creek. Evacuating Bentonville, the Federal horsemen re-
traced their route of march. When he reached camp at 8 p.m.,
Bussey turned over to the provost-marshal about 50 greyclad
stragglers that had been captured by his command on its
forced reconnaissance to Bentonville.^'
As soon as he learned that Bussey's troopers were in con-
tact with Colonel Stone's pickets. Creen put the trains into
motion. Major Crump with his battalion of Texas cavalry-
men was sent to reinforce the troopers manning the line of
outposts which were established on the prairie south of Ben-
tonville. By the time Crump's troopers arrived on the scene,
the Federals had evacuated Bentonville and were returning
to their camps.^ ^
Soon after the trains reached Elm Springs on the afternoon
of the 9th, a message signed by Ceneral Van Dorn reached
Creen. Creen was directed to rush to the army a number of
ordnance wagons loaded with amunition. A rendezvous east
of Fayetteville was • designated. Lieutenant Colonel J. W.
Priest with a 100-man detail was placed in charge of the
wagons. Before reaching the rendezvous. Priest's detachment
ran into trouble and was compelled to turn back. While re-
turning to Elm Springs, Priest's command was attacked by
one of Curtis' roving patrols. The Federals were beaten off.
In the meantime. Creen had received a second note from
Van Dorn, urging "the amunition must be brought up if
21 Ibid., 235, 270.
22 Ibid., 3 1 7 , • ; , , . .
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possible." Green accordingly ordered out Golonel Joseph G.
Porter with 200 of Watie's Indians. Porter and the Indians
joined Priest before he reached Elm Springs. As soon as the
wagons could be turned around, the train headed eastward.
Too much time had been wasted. By the time the ordnance
wagons and their escort reached the rendezvous, the army
had pushed on. Betracing its steps. Porter's command re-
joined Green at Walnut GroVe.
Golonel Gooper and the Indian brigade stayed with Green's
column as long as it remained at Elm Springs. At the same
time, Golonel Stone employed his command to patrol the
prairies north of the wagon park. When Green put his troops '
into motion for Frog Bayou, Gooper's troopers broke camp
and headed for the Indian Territory.^^
» « o
General Gurtis' Army of the Southwest remained camped
on the battlefield until March 12. Then, "to avoid the stench,"
the army moved down the valley of Little Sugar Greek and
occupied Gamp Stephens.^*
The scenes following the terrible fighting were grim. For
miles, the fields and woods were strewn with, war's grim
harvest. On the 7th, dry leaves had caught fire, adding to
the smoke, flame, and confusion of battle. Spreading through
the timber, the flames had burned and blackened the dead,
and added to the tortures of the wounded. A number of
badly injured men had perished in the fires before the hos-
pital stewards could reach them. Writing while his memories
of the battle were still vivid, Gaptain Samuel P. Gurtis re-
ported:
On the cliffs of Elkhorn [Pea Ridge] lay many wounded rebels,
helpless and suffering in the bushes; here one with a wound in
the bowels, imploring every passer-by to put an end to his agony;
there another, pale in rapidly approaching death, with an entire
leg torn away by a cannon ball and the ragged, bloody stump
dabbled in the dirt, yet, calmly smiling and thanking his late Union
foe for the swallow of luekwarm water from the Droken canteen
picked up on the field of battle; here a corpse, with the head
as neatly removed by a cannon ball as if done by the guillotine;
there a shattered ghastly arm, grasping a bent aiid broken flint-
23 Ibid., 317-318. Colonel Stone's command consisted of his regi-
ment, the 6th Texas Cavalry, and the 1st Arkansas Cavalry Battalion.
24 Curtis, "The Army of the South-West, and the First Campaign in
Arkansas," Annals of Iowa, Vol. VI, No. IV, 249.
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lock; everywhere scattered blankets and homemade quilts and
coverlets, and in the woods below and beyond, muskets, arms, and
dead and wounded rebels in the common costume of the
countiy, home-spun "butternut," or the coarse, gray uniform of
tlie Confederate soldiers. Many were partly clad in Federal uni-
fonns torn from our dead and wounded in battle. The latter were
generally found partially stripped, especially in the matter of shoes
and stockings, of which articles the rebels stood in great need.25
North of Leetown, the dead were scattered through the
corn fields and in the thick underbrush. The bodies had been
exposed for two days. The heavy rain which fell on the
morning of the 9th had "washed white their exposed flesh,
and many were partially devoured by hogs."
Young Curtis, on examining thé'-lane where the fight be-
tween Trimble's patrol and the Texans occurred, found a
large number of dead. "Here," he recalled, "were to be found
huge home-made bowie-kiiiyes of the [Texas] rangers; here,
also, lay unburied, many of Pike's Indians."
Besides the bodies, the people policing the area wbere
the Leetown fight transpired found "guns, cartridge boxes,
bayonets, etc, with solid shot, and shell exploded and unex-
ploded, and all the general debris of battle." s^
Every house for mues around was taken over and turned
into a bospital. Red hospital flags, often an old handkerchief
or piece of cloth from the dress of the wife of some farmer,
flapped in the breeze "over tenements tbat any otber time
would only have been used as stables or outbuildings."
In Leetown every house was filled with wounded. To take
care of the overflow, the regimental surgeon of the 59th
Illinois, Dr. H. J. Maynard, ordered tents pitched. The cooks
were turned to and helped the bospital stewards take care of
the wounded. Nothing tbat would tend to alleviate the suffer-
ing was neglected. According to the regimental historian of
the 59th Illinois, "Long will the wounded of Pea Ridge re-
member Dr. H. J. Maynard." 27
Elkborn Tavern which had served both armies as a hospital
was fßled with wounded. Piled up like cord wood on the
porch of the hotel were the bodies of men wbo had died on
25 Curtis, "The Army of the South-West, and the First Campaign in
Arkansas,': ¡Annals of Iouia, Vol. Vl, No. I l l , 143-144.
26 Ibid.; Lathrop, History of the S9th Illinois,.Q7.
27 Lalhrop, History of the 59th Illinois, 97. . 1 : , ' '
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the operating table or immediately afterwards. Teams of
Confederate surgeons administered to their wounded. As
soon as the injured Secessionists were ready to travel, they
were paroled and sent to Fayetteville; the disabled bluecoats
were evacuated to Cassville.^^
After examining the returns subinitted by his officers,
Curtis listed his casualties in battle as 203 killed, 980
wounded, and 201 missing. Out of 10,000 effectives engaged,
the Federals lost 14 per cent. Because Carr's and Davis'
divisions had done the lion's share of the fighting, they suf-
fered much worse than the units of Sigel's wing. Carr's di-
vision, composed principally of Iowa and Illinois troops, had
covered itself with glory. But in doing so, Carr had lost 28
per cent of the men carried into action. The 3d Iowa Cavalry
had also been hard hit. In the fighting north of Leetown on
the 7th, Colonel Bussey had seen 21 per cent of his men cut
A detailed return of the Confederate casualties in the battle
was never filed by General Van Dorn. In his preliminary re-
port forwarded to Richmond from Van Buren on March 18,
the Confederate leader noted, "Our loss was not as heavy,
however, as I had thought and was reported to me, not being
more than 800 or 1,000 killed and wounded and between 200
and 300 prisoners." 3°
Nine days later. Van Dorn writing from Jacksonport scaled
down his losses. He informed the War Department that his
killed and wounded totaled about 600, while the Federals
had captured approximately 200 of his men.^'
In addition to the many killed, wounded, and captured, a
large number of the Confederates left the columns. While
many of these straggled, others had their fill of war. These
men returned to tbeir homes. If they were behind Union
lines, many took the loyality oath, while others headed for
the frontier. A rough figure on what this entailed may be
obtained by taking the effective strength of McCulloch's
28 Curtis, "The Anny of the South-West, and the First Campaign in
Arkansas," Annals of lotea. Vol. VI, No. Il l , 144, 145.
29 Ibid., 145; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 204-206, 235, 261.
30 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 282.
31 Ibid., 285,
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division on March 2 which was 8,384 and subtracting from it
the reported strength of the division on March 11—2,894. It
should be noted that the March 11 figure for the division does
not include Stone's command (the 6th Texas Cavalry and the
1st Arkansas Cavalry Battalion) probably 900 effectives and
three of the four attached batteries (Cood's, Caines', and
Provence's).^^
Subsequent to the battle, Ceneral Curtis informed Colonel
Dodge that "the secret of our victory was the tenacity with
which" Carr's division held its position on the 7th at Elkhorn
Tavern, while Davis' and Osterhaus' troops were repulsing
McCulloch's wing north of Leetown. Since only part of Mc-
Culloch's former command joined Van Dom on the night of
the 7th, he was at a marked disadvantage when Curtis,
who had concentrated his army, renewed the battle on March
8.33
Both Ceneral Price and Colonel Dodge believed, and cor-
rectly, that the key to the Union success was Price's failure
to get into position to attack at daybreak on the 7th. Price's
column, as it pushed forward along the Bentonville Detour,
ran afoul of the felled timber with which Dodge's working
parties had barricaded the road. His column was delayed. Ac-
cording to Dodge, "the attack that should have been made
at daylight (which would no doubt have been a surprise to
us) was delayed till 8 o'clock." 3'*
By his victory at Pea Ridge, Curtis made certain that the
Union would hold Missouri, a key state. If the Confederates
had reached St. Louis, as Van Dom had planned, they would
have gained control of the mouth of the Missouri River. An
invasion of Illinois and Iowa would have been a distinct
threat.
Hereafter no Confederate army was able to maintain a foot-
hold in Missouri. Raiding columns swept into Missouri
on many occasions, but they would be compelled to fall
back. Partisan warfare raged in Missouri throughout the
remainder of the war, but the Confederacy saw the state of
Missouri slip from its grasp.
32 Ihid., 763, 766.
33 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52.
34 Ihid.

